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Liberal Cosmopolitanism: 




I have learned a great deal from this rich argument, especially with regard to the 
analysis of the position that David Chandler refers to as “radical poststructuralist” 
and the problems with it that he so clearly analyses, sometimes with a biting but 
appropriate sense of sarcasm. However, the way that he criticises the other family 
of theories regarding the alleged emergence of a post-territorial political commu-
nity, namely the liberal cosmopolitan position, is less convincing. And the main 
reason for this is that it is doubtful that the portrayal of this perspective on cosmo-
politanism is inclusive enough, given the internal diversity of theories and posi-
tions that seem to be covered by the label “liberal cosmopolitanism.” 
I believe Chandler does not demonstrate that, in general: 1) liberal cosmopolitan-
ism rejects state-based political community in favour of global networked civil so-
ciety; 2) liberal cosmopolitanism undermines the modern liberal conception of the 
rights bearing subject, and; 3) liberal cosmopolitanism sidelines the electorate as 
being irrelevant for the establishment of progressive ends.
The question that his argument (and the way that it is framed) raises is this: To 
what extent is Chandler’s representation of liberal cosmopolitanism accurate? To 
what extent does it exclude articulations of liberal cosmopolitanism, namely those 
that do not rest on a functioning global civil society and that do take questions of 
representation and forms of non-state based democracy seriously?
To start with, let us take a recent example, namely Simon Caney’s Justice Beyond 
Borders.1 In this book, Caney argues for a cosmopolitan political morality on the ba-
sis of liberal premises. Yet Chandler’s critique of liberal cosmopolitanism does not 
seem to hold on several points. First of all, Caney rejects the claim “that cosmopoli-
tan political institutions are unnecessary because global civil society is sufficient” 
(ibid, p. 172). Caney provides several arguments for this. One of these arguments 
seems especially relevant given Chandler’s irritation with the suggestion that glo-
bal civil society is characterized by “public/global/ethical debate,” a suggestion that 
he ascribes to liberal cosmopolitanism. Chandler deems this claim to be a case 
of intellectual dishonesty for the reason that there is no debate in any meaning-
ful sense of the term in deterritorialized global space (Chandler, pp. 11-12). Caney, 
however, would agree. The reason that Caney argues for the establishment of glo-
1. Simon Caney, Justice Beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005).
bal political structures is precisely that these are necessary to facilitate meaningful 
discussion, argument and debate across national borders.
Secondly, concerning the democratic deficit of the networked conceptions of 
the post-territorial political community – the fact that NGO’s that constitute this 
community, together with social movements and other non-state actors, claim to 
represent the people, without an electorate –, Caney’s position seems to defy again 
the somewhat generalized notion of liberal cosmopolitanism that Chandler works 
with. To quote Caney again: “the case for an active civil society gives us no reason 
to abandon the right-based case for supra-state political institutions for it cannot 
ensure that all are able to exercise control over the institutions that impact on their 
rights” (ibid., 172).
For this reason, Caney argues for global political institutions that are more dem-
ocratically accountable (such as a reformed UN, EU, WTO, IMF, and Word Bank) 
and for a system of multi-level governance in which a political community on the 
state level is not simply abandoned.2 This raises the question to what extent Chan-
dler is really arguing with liberal cosmopolitanism, which Caney affiliates himself 
with, or rather with a more limited family of approaches that we could refer to as 
“civil society cosmopolitanism.”
Another counterexample to Chandler’s identification of liberal cosmopolitan-
ism with these networked, global civil society approaches is David Held. It would 
take a rather extreme form of selective reading to pigeon-hole Held into the camp 
of civil society cosmopolitanism. Held argues that national democracies require 
international democracy if they are to be sustained and developed in the contem-
porary era. The belief that democracy is served simply by having states which elect 
governments is undermined, according to Held, by the interdependent character 
of the modern world. There are many supra-national organizations that seriously 
and progressively diminish the range of decisions open to national majorities. 
Hence Held argues not for simply cherishing “global civil society,” but for a cos-
mopolitan model of democracy, with regional parliaments, general referendums 
cutting across nation and nation-states, and the opening up of international gov-
ernmental organizations to public scrutiny and democratization. Held stresses 
that these changes assume the entrenchment of a cluster of rights, including civil, 
political, economical and social rights, in order to provide shape and limits to dem-
ocratic decision making.3
Again my question: to what extent is Chandler’s representation of liberal cos-
mopolitanism fair to these types of positions? Is his notion of liberal cosmopoli-
tanism – and now I will put it a bit stronger –simply a straw man? If so, he has 
failed to really demonstrate that liberal cosmopolitanism works with a notion of 
2. See for instance Caney’s – though heavily qualified – acceptance of national self-determination 
(ibid, pp. 178 ff.).
3. See amongst others, David Held, “Democracy: From City-States to a Cosmopolitan Order,” in 
Robert Goodin and Philip Pettit (eds.), Contemporary Political Philosophy (Blackwell, 2006), pp. 674-
696.
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“democracy without formal representation” or that the electorate is being sidelined 
in liberal cosmopolitanism as irrelevant for the establishment of progressive ends 
or that “political community necessarily takes a territorial form at the level of the 
organization for political representation on the basis of the nation state” (Chandler, 
pp. 7, 12)? 
That does not imply that I believe that democracy on a supra-state level is easy 
to bring about or even possible. I just doubt whether the impossibility of this nor-
mative ideal has been convincingly questioned here. For not only do Caney and 
Held work with a rights-based approach to global political institutions, but also do 
they argue for the importance of democratic accountability thereof. And neither 
of them simply rejects state based political community in favour of, naively, going 
global.
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